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We solve the Ramsey-optimal tax plan for a small open economy with an 
endogenously-determined real exchange rate. The open economy constrains the government’s 
setting of the capital income tax rate since physical capital cannot be dominated in rate of return by 
foreign assets. However, the endogenous real exchange rate loosens this constraint relative to a 
one good open economy model in which the real exchange rate is necessarily fixed. We find that, 
the dynamics of the two good small open economy model more closely resemble those of a closed 
economy model than a one good small open economy model. 
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Much is known in the macroeconomics literature about Ramsey-optimal taxation in closed 
environments as evidenced by the extensive literature that traces back to Lucas and Stokey (1983), 
Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985).
1
 A key finding in the literature is that capital income should 
initially be taxed at very high rates, but in the long run not at all. The intuition for this finding is as 
in Ramsey (1927): the government should tax most heavily those factors that are in inelastic 
supply. 
Far less is known about Ramsey-optimal taxation in the context of open economy 
macroeconomic models. In Correia (1996) and the subsequent literature on Ramsey taxation in 
open economy models, there is a homogeneous good, thereby fixing the real exchange rate at one. 
In such an environment, the government is constrained in its initial setting of the capital income 
tax rate. In particular, a no-arbitrage condition forces the after-tax return to capital to equal the 
exogenous world real interest rate. As shown in Correia (1996), the government finds it best not to 
increase the capital income tax rate, even in the very short term. 
Our paper is the first to address Ramsey optimal taxation with distinct domestic and 
foreign goods, and so an endogenous real exchange rate. While the Ramsey planner is still 
constrained by the no-arbitrage condition described above, real exchange rate movements mean 
that the relevant world return is no longer fixed. The solutions of the model show that the dynamics 
of the two good small open economy model fairly closely resemble those of a closed economy 
model, not the one good small open economy model. As in the closed economy model, the Ramsey 
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 By “Ramsey-optimal taxation” we mean work that solves for at least a set of tax rates as well as the path for 
government debt. The path for government debt is often implicit. This definition excludes those papers that hold fixed 











tax plan in the two good model calls for very high capital income tax rates in the short run. 
Satisfying the no arbitrage condition requires an initial real exchange rate depreciation (when the 
capital income tax rate is high), followed by an appreciation. Due to the initially high capital 
income taxation, government debt falls sharply in the closed and two good small open economy 
models; in the one good open economy model, there is little change in government debt. 
Arguably, the two good model, with its endogenous determination of the real exchange 
rate, better describes the environment faced by governments than either the one good open 
economy model or the closed economy model. The differences in the capital income tax rate 
dynamics across the two small open economy models point to the importance of real exchange rate 
determination. 
One may well wonder why the government does not simply apply very high tax rates early 
in its implementation of the Ramsey tax program in order to become a net creditor (drive its debt 
very negative), financing its expenditures on public goods from its interest revenue. That is, why 
does the government not choose a value for its debt so that it replicates the Pareto optimal outcome 
with no taxes? The answer is that achieving such a level of government debt is, evidently, too 
costly. Indeed, the existing literature does not predict zero labor income tax rates precisely because 
the Lagrange multiplier on the implementability constraint binds. This point is made more 
formally in Section 3. 
Following the Ramsey literature, the government is restricted to linear tax schedules, 
although it is free to tax labor and capital income at different rates. The government is able to fully 
and credibly commit to the Ramsey optimal taxation program. Adopting a residence-based 
taxation scheme, income from foreign bonds are implicitly taxed by the foreign government, not 











of public goods. A practical advantage of analyzing a small open economy is that strategic 
interactions between governments can be ignored. 
The bulk of Section 2 develops the two good small open economy model; towards the end 
of this section is a brief description of how the two good model can be reduced to either a closed 
economy model, or a one good small open economy model. Fiscal policy – the Ramsey problem – 
is presented in Section 3. The model is calibrated in Section 4. The key results, in the form of time 
paths for macroeconomic variables, are discussed in Section 5. The implications of alternative 
settings for preference parameters and the trade parameters are presented in Section 6. Some final 
remarks are made in Section 7. 
 
2. A Two Good, Small Open Economy Model 
In the two good model, private consumption is a composite of domestic and foreign goods. 
Attention is focused on the home or domestic economy; an asterisk is used to denote values of 
foreign, or rest of the world, variables. 
 
Households 
The typical domestic household starts period t  with three assets: 1tk   units of domestic 
capital, 1td   units of domestic government debt, and 1tb   units of internationally traded bonds. 
Capital income is taxed at the rate k
t . The gross return to a unit of capital is, then, 
1 (1 )k kt t tR r      where tr  is the real rental rate for capital and   the depreciation rate of 
capital. The gross return to a unit of government debt is d
tR . Finally, international bonds pay off in 
terms of foreign output; this return, bR , is assumed to be constant. Conceptually, the international 











state contingent notation is suppressed in the interest of a cleaner presentation. The fact that the 
international bonds are state contingent means that the implicit assumption that only domestic 
households own domestic capital and domestic government debt is without loss of generality. 
The representative domestic household receives utility from a private composite 
consumption good, 
tc , a government or public good, tg , and disutility from working, th . The 
household’s problem is: 
 
{ , , , , } =0=0
( , , )max
t
t t t
c h k d b tt t t t t t
U c g h


  (1) 
subject to the sequence of budget constraints, 
   1 1 11 .h kt tt t t t t t t t t t t td b
t
d b
p c k e w h R k d e b
R R
             (2) 
The last two terms on the right-hand side of (2) are the proceeds of previous period purchases of 
domestic and international bonds. Since the international bond is denominated in terms of foreign 
output, the proceeds from this bond are converted into units of domestic output via the real 
exchange rate, te , which is expressed in terms of the number of units of domestic output per unit 
of foreign output. The first two terms on the right-hand side are payments to labor and capital: in 
addition to the capital income components discussed above, tw  is the real wage which is taxed at 
the rate h
t . Finally,   is a lump-sum transfer. 
In addition to bond purchases (the last two terms on the left-hand side of (2)), the domestic 
household purchases private consumption goods and capital. The price of a unit of consumption in 
terms of domestic output is tp ; its derivation is described shortly. 
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where > 0  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods; 
=1 (1 )n   ; n  is the relative size of the domestic economy; and   is a measure of trade 
openness. Solving the relevant cost minimization problem yields the relative price for aggregated 
private domestic consumption, 
 
1
1 1= (1 ) ,t tp e
         (4) 
as well as demands for domestic and foreign goods, 
 1 1= (1 )ht t tc e c

          (5) 
 1 1= (1 ) 1 .ft t tc e c

          (6) 
The corresponding expressions for foreign households are: 
 * * * * 1 *1= (1 )ht tc e c

          (7) 
 * * * 1 *1= (1 ) 1ft tc e c

          (8) 
where * = n  . 
 
Firms 
The representative firm has access to a neoclassical production function, F . The firm 
rents capital and hires labor on competitive factor markets to maximize period-by-period profits, 













The problem of a benevolent government planner is analyzed in Section 3. For the purpose 
of analyzing the competitive equilibrium, it is sufficient to note that the government finances the 
stream of public goods, 
tg , and lump-sum transfers,  , by either issuing debt, td , or levying 




t t t t t t t td
t
d
d g w h rk
R
        (9) 
as well as the usual transversality condition concerning its debt. In (9), it is understood that the 
quantities are expressed per capita. 
 
Competitive Equilibrium 
The definition of a competitive equilibrium is standard: Given prices and government 
actions, households solve their utility maximization problems, firms solve their profit 
maximization problems, the government satisfies its budget constraint and ‘no Ponzi scheme’ 
condition, and markets clear. 
As in De Paoli (2009), the small open economy is the limit case (as 0n ) of a two 
country model. The domestic goods market clearing condition is 
 *
1= (1 ) (1 ) .t t t t t t ty p c e c k k g
           (10) 
In addition, the balance of payments must be satisfied: 
 1 * 1 1 1(1 ) = 0.
t
t t t t b
b
e c e c b
R

                (11) 
The first term is exports, denominated in foreign output while the second term is imports similarly 
expressed in units of foreign output. The remaining terms are the redemption of international 















The Ramsey optimal taxation literature has considered two other classes of models that can 
be viewed as special cases of the two good, small open economy model. The bulk of the Ramsey 
optimal taxation literature has focused on closed economies. In this case, set foreign bond holdings 
to zero ( = 0tb ). There are no foreign goods and so no consumption aggregator, and the relative 
price of the consumption good is unity ( =1tp ). 
The open economy models analyzed in the literature have one good. In this case, since 
domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes, the real exchange rate ( te ) is one as is the 
relative price of consumption ( tp ). There is no need to introduce the consumption aggregator, (3). 
The goods market clearing condition now reads 
 1= (1 )t t t t t ty c nx k k g       (12) 









3. The Ramsey Taxation Problem 
The problem of the benevolent Ramsey planner is to choose a sequence for tax rates so as 
to maximize lifetime utility of the representative household given that the resulting allocation 
constitutes a competitive equilibrium. The usual approach employed in the Ramsey optimal 











rates; the planner then chooses an allocation directly subject to this implementability condition. 
Issues related to the open economy setting are addressed below. 
To flesh out the derivation of the implementability condition, write the household’s 
problem as choosing 
=0{ , , , , }t t t t t tc h k d b
  to maximize 
   1 1 1
=0
= ( , , ) 1 .t h k t tt t t t t t t t t t t t t t t td b
t t
d b
U c g h w h R k d e b p c k e
R R
   

  
   
           
   
 (13) 
The associated first-order conditions are: 
 ( , , ) =t c t t t t tU c g h p   (14) 



















   (18) 
Substituting (14) to (18) into 
   1 1 1
=0
1 ,h k t tt t t t t t t t t t t t td b
t t
d b






         
 
  (19) 
and recognizing that each term in the sum must equal zero, delivers the implementability 
condition, 
    0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
=0 0
( , , )
( , , )( ) ( , , ) =t kcc t t t t h t t t t
t
U c g h




       (20) 
At this stage, we write the Ramsey problem as: maximize (1) subject to the 
implementability condition, (20), the pricing equation, (4), feasibility, (10), the balance of 





















  (21) 
The easiest way to impose the set of return arbitrage conditions in (21) is via an international 
risk-sharing condition which we now develop. Notice that (14) and (18) imply the following Euler 
equation: 
 1 1 1 1
1
( , , ) ( , , )
= .bt c t t t t c t t t
t t
eU c g h e U c g h
R
p p
    

 (22) 
The corresponding Euler equation for foreign households is 
 




( , , ) ( , , )
= ;bc t t t c t t t
t t
U c g h U c g h
R
p p
   

 (23) 
the real exchange rate does not appear in (23) since international bonds are denominated in units of 
foreign output. As in Chari et al. (2000), solve (22) and (23) for the common bond return, bR , then 
iterate backwards: 
 1 1 1 1 1
* * * * * * * * * *
1 1 1 1
( , , ) / ( , , ) /
= .
( , , ) / ( , , ) /
t c t t t t c
c t t t t c
eU c g h p e U c g h p
U c g h p U c g h p
    
   
 (24) 
The right-hand side of (24) is given by history and so constant. An implication of (24) is that the 
real exchange rate is determined by the ratios of prices and marginal utilities of private 
consumption between domestic and foreign households, and the arbitrary factor of proportionality 
given by history. Since the rest of the world is assumed to be in a steady state, this condition can be 
written 
 
( , , )
= .t c t t t
t
eU c g h
p
  (25) 
This is the relevant risk-sharing condition for the Ramsey problem and necessarily implies that the 
no-arbitrage conditions (21) are satisfied. 











work with the international solvency condition that is obtained by iterating forward on (11): 
 













       

      (26) 
This international solvency condition states that the present value of net exports must equal net 
foreign indebtedness. Notice that the steady state version of the bond accumulation Euler equation 
(22) implies that =1bR ; in other words, domestic households are as patient as foreign 
households. This fact will be used below to simplify the Ramsey planner’s problem. 
The Ramsey taxation problem can, now, formally be written: 
 
 
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   
 
 
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
 
   
  
       

 (27) 
Purists may object that leaving in the prices tp  and te  means that we have not properly 
written down the Ramsey problem. In principle, the price equation and international risk-sharing 
condition, (4) and (24), could be used to solve out for tp  and te  in terms of quantities.
2
 Doing so 
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leads to messy expressions in the Ramsey problem that would have to be differentiated to obtain 
the associated first-order conditions. In any event, 
tp  and te  can be thought of as “book keeping 
devices”: 
tp  stands in for the marginal rate of transformation between private home and foreign 
goods, while 
te  corresponds to the price adjusted marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption of home and foreign households. 
It is extremely convenient that neither government debt nor international bonds appear in 
the Ramsey problem (27) since it is well known that the dynamics of the equations governing these 
variables are inherently unstable. To solve for these bond sequences, solve backwards from the 
final steady state; in this way, small numerical errors will not accumulate. 
In computing solutions to Ramsey problems, one typically starts with some guess for  , 
the multiplier associated with the implementability condition, then solve for the allocation. Given 
the resulting allocation, check whether the implementability condition is satisfied. If not, make an 
appropriate adjustment to the value of the multiplier, and re-solve for the allocation. To this, the 
open economy adds  , the multiplier on the international solvency condition, and a subsequent 
check on whether this condition is satisfied. Conditional on the guesses for the multipliers on the 
implementability and international solvency conditions, the model is solved using an extended 
path algorithm (Fair and Taylor, 1983), specifying an initial steady state and a ‘no change’ 
terminal conditions (for details, see Auray et al., 2016). 
Of the Ramsey planner’s first-order conditions, the one of intrinsic interest is that with 
respect to capital: 
  1 1= ( , ) 1 .t t k t tF k h       (28) 
Compare this equation with the corresponding household Euler equation, obtained by combining 











 1 1 1
1 1
1
( , , ) ( , , )
= (1 ) ( , ) 1 .kc t t t c t t t t k t t
t t
U c g h U c g h
F k h
p p
      

      (29) 
Mutual consistency of these two equations delivers the classic Chamley-Judd prescription that in 
the long run, when the economy converges to its eventual final steady state, capital income should 




The utility function is of the constant relative risk aversion variety 
 
1
( , )(1 )
( , , ) = ,
1
C c g h







where ( , )C c g  is an aggregator over private and public consumption goods, given by 
1 1 1








It is understood that the consumption aggregator is Cobb-Douglas when =1 , and the utility 
function is logarithmic when =1 . 
Production is Cobb-Douglas: 
1= ( , ) = .y F k h k h   
 
Parameterization 
Some of the parameters are set exogenously. A model period corresponds to one year. The 
world real interest rate is, then, set to the conventional 4%: =1.04bR . The analysis of the tax 











coefficient of relative risk aversion,  , is set to one which implies logarithmic preferences, and 
the consumption aggregator is Cobb-Douglas ( =1 ). The trade openness parameter,  , is set to 
0.3  on the basis that the world share of imports is 30 %; and the elasticity of substitution between 
home and foreign goods,  , is set to 1.5  as in Backus et al. (1992). Section 6 explores the 
implications of alternative values for   and  . 
For a number of parameters, there is a direct link between their values and calibration 
targets. Thus, = 0.3  and = 0.075  based on evidence on capital’s share of income and the 
depreciation rate for capital presented in Gomme and Rupert (2007). The discount factor must be 
consistent with the steady state version of the international bond Euler equations, (22): =1/ bR
. Factor income tax rates are = 28.59%n  and = 37.10%k  based on average effective tax rates 
for the U.S. over the period 2005–07; see Auray et al. (2017) for details. The real exchange rate is 
normalized to =1e . From (4), it then follows that =1p  in steady state. 
Two parameters remain to be calibrated:  , the preference weight on public goods, and 
 , the preference weight on leisure. Given the parameters discussed above, a steady state delivers 
values for private and public consumption ( c  and g ), hours worked ( n ), the capital stock ( k ) 




( , , )
(1 ) ( , ) ( , , ) = 0,h c t t tt t t h t t t
t
U c g h
F k h U c g h
p
    (30) 
the capital accumulation Euler equation (29), feasibility (10) as well as: zero net exports, and a 
government share of output of 19.55 %. The parameters   and   are, then, set such that 
average hours worked is 30% of the time endowment (a value consistent with U.S. time use 











the marginal utility of public goods. The resulting parameter values are: = 0.2323  and 
=1.33 . 
That the real exchange rate is normalized to equal one while net exports are set to zero 
implies that the steady states of the open economy models coincide with that of the closed 
economy model. Requiring that the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between private 
and public goods is one is motivated by the fact that this setting is consistent with what would be 
chosen by a benevolent social planner given that the marginal rate of transformation between these 
two goods is one. Consequently, in solving the Ramsey problem, there is no obvious means to 
improve the representative household’s lifetime utility by simply reallocating private and public 
goods so that their marginal rate of substitution equals their marginal rate of transformation. 
Finally, the lump-sum transfer,  , is chosen so that the government debt-output ratio is 
equal to one – a value close to that currently observed for the U.S. and a number of EU countries. 
 
5. Tax Reforms 
At time 0 , the government announces its policy in the form of time paths for public 
spending and income tax rates: 
1 =0{ , , }
h k
t t t tg  

 . As is common in the Ramsey taxation literature, 
the government is not free to choose the initial capital income tax rate, 
0
k , otherwise it would set 
this tax rate sufficiently high to drive its debt negative enough to finance all of its current and 
future expenditures from the interest income. The short run dynamics of these tax reforms are 
presented in Fig. 1 while the long run steady states are summarized in Table 1. 
 












To start, consider government policy, starting with the closed economy model, then the 
two good open economy model. The most dramatic effects are with respect to the capital income 
tax rate and government debt. In the closed economy model, the capital income tax rate rises from 
37.1% to 260 % in period 1, after which it immediately falls to around 0 %.
3
 In the first period, 
the government actually subsidizes labor income (
0 = 24
h  %), presumably to boost hours worked 
and so output. This tax rate then rises to around its eventual long run value of 32 %, roughly 3.7  
percentage points above its initial level. While public goods fall in the short term, the new steady 
state sees an 11% increase. The initial rise in the capital income tax rate drives down government 
debt to such an extent that the government becomes a net creditor (government debt is negative). 
The combination of somewhat higher government spending, positive revenue from government 
debt, and an expansion of the labor income tax base eventually leads to a modest 3.65  percentage 
point rise in the labor income tax rate. 
 
Table 1: Initial and Terminal Steady States 
 Initial Closed One Good Small Open 
Economy 
Two Good Small 
Open Economy 
h  0.2859 0.3224 0.4114 0.3920 
k  0.3710 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
y  0.3709 0.4608 0.4582 0.4500 
/c y  0.6814 0.6300 0.5516 0.5778 
                                                 
3
 The path for the capital income tax rate is broadly consistent with theoretical results for the Ramsey taxation 
literature which describe what happens in the short term (very high capital income tax rates) and in the very long term 











/k y  1.6409 2.6087 2.6087 2.6087 
h  0.3000 0.3055 0.3038 0.2984 
/g y  0.1955 0.1744 0.1931 0.2136 
/d y  1.0000 –0.2884 0.8366 –0.0788 
/b y  0.0000  –1.5511 –0.1504 
/nx y  0.0000  0.0597 0.0058 
e  1.0000  1.0000 1.0410 
   5.5320 5.2334 4.3614 
 
For the two good small open economy model, the dynamics of the government policy 
variables are broadly similar to those in the closed economy model. While the initial hike in the 
capital income tax rate is impressive 
1( = 216
k %), it falls short of the 260 % tax rate in the closed 
economy model. The fall in government debt is correspondingly somewhat smaller as seen in Fig. 
1(i), although in both models the government ends up a net creditor. Relative to the closed 
economy, the two main factors in the open economy leading to a higher labor income tax rate are: 
less revenue from government assets, and greater public spending (see Fig. (c)). In the long run, 
the labor income tax rate is 39.2%, 10.3  percentage points higher than its initial value. 
Fiscal policy in the one good open economy model differs starkly from the other two model 
economies. In this case, the Ramsey government never raises the capital income tax rate. To the 
contrary, as in Correia (1996), it immediately drops this tax rate to its long run value of zero. This 
result can be explained via the no-arbitrage condition between the returns to capital and the 













1 1 1(1 ) ( , ) 1 = .
k b
t t tF k h R      (31) 
An increase in the future capital income tax rate lowers the return to capital. Maintaining equality 
between the return to capital and the fixed world real interest rate leads to capital flight. Instead, 
the Ramsey planner lowers the future capital income tax rate, and capital floods in. Such an 
increase in the capital stock raises real wages. It would seem that the increase in labor income tax 
revenue more than makes up for the lost capital income tax revenue which seems plausible since 
the labor income tax base is more than twice the size of the capital income tax base (their income 
shares were calibrated to 70 % and 30 %, respectively). 
To understand the differences in the paths of the capital income tax rate in the two open 
economy environments, compare the no-arbitrage condition for the one good model with its two 
good model counterpart: 
 1





F k h R
e
       (32) 
The essential difference is the two exchange rate terms in (32). From Fig. 1(j), the planner initially 
depreciates the real exchange rate ( 0e  rises above its initial steady state value), then sharply 
appreciates it. The timing of the real exchange rate movements serve to reduce the effective return 
to international bonds (the right-hand side of (32)). As a result, in the two good environment, the 
planner can markedly raise the capital income tax rate with only a modest effect on investment. 
Returning to fiscal policy in the one good open economy model, government debt changes 
little, principally because the planner never chooses to raise the capital income tax rate. The long 
run increase in public goods along with little change in government debt necessitate a higher long 
run increase in the labor income tax rate: 12.55  percentage points, the largest increase in the three 











The dynamics of macroeconomic variables can be attributed largely to the path of the 
capital income tax rate. In the closed economy, the initial spike in this tax rate depresses 
investment, allowing private consumption to rise. Remember that the planner must respect the 
competitive equilibrium conditions. Germane to this discussion is the household’s capital 
accumulation Euler equation, (29). The immediate effect of the capital income tax dropping to 
zero, is a sharp rise in the return to capital. In response, the household increases its investment at 
the expense of its consumption. At the same time, the planner lowers public consumption in order 
to free up output for investment. The resulting decrease in private consumption raises the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution which limits the short term increase in capital. As a 
result, capital rises gradually to its new long run value as depicted in Fig. 1(d). 
It is well known that open economy macroeconomic models disconnect the intertemporal 
marginal rate of substitution from the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation. This point is 
well illustrated in the one good open economy model: the domestic economy can sharply increase 
its capital stock without sacrificing consumption. In fact, in the one good model, the international 
risk-sharing condition (25) along with separable preferences implies no change in private 
consumption. Similar considerations are in play in the two good open economy model, although in 
this case the planner chooses a more gradual buildup of the capital stock than is seen in the one 
good model. The initial real exchange rate depreciation raises the relative price of aggregate 
private consumption, which serves to moderate the increase in private consumption in the initial 
period. The subsequent appreciation leads to a fall in the relative price of consumption (the path of 
this price follows that of the real exchange rate). As discussed in  Benigno and De Paoli (2010), 
this real exchange rate appreciation tends to raise the path for consumption and lower that of hours. 











the capital income tax rate leads to a one period increase in private consumption. On its own, such 
an increase in consumption would tend to reduce hours worked, an effect operating through the 
labor-leisure Euler equation (30). To forestall this drop in hours, and associated fall in output, the 
planner temporarily reduces the labor income tax rate. In fact, as discussed earlier, in the closed 
economy, the planner actually subsidizes wage income. Such considerations are absent from the 
one good open economy model, and in this case the labor income tax immediately rises, resulting 
in a temporary decline in hours worked as shown in Fig. 1(e). 
In the one good open economy model, the sharp rise in the capital stock depicted in Fig. 
1(d) is financed chiefly through negative net exports (Fig. 1(l)) leading to a negative net foreign 
asset position as shown in Fig. 1(k). The home economy subsequently pays for this infusion of 
capital by running positive trade balances. In contrast, in the two good setting, the initial real 
exchange rate depreciation makes home goods cheaper relative to foreign goods; consequently, on 
impact exports rise while imports fall leading to a modest increase in net exports, and an initial rise 
in net foreign assets. The subsequent real exchange rate appreciation and buildup of capital lead to 
negative net exports and net foreign assets go negative. In the long run, the home country is a net 
foreign debtor and so runs trade balance surpluses to service this debt. 
To evaluate the efficacy of the tax reforms, compute the welfare benefit as the percentage 
of private consumption that can be taken from households (holding fixed both public consumption 
and hours worked) that leaves them with the same utility as the original steady state. That is, the 
welfare benefit is measured by the value of   that satisfies 
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For the closed economy model, the welfare benefit of the tax reform is 5.5% of consumption; for 











model, 5.2%. It may seem odd that both open economy models predict a lower welfare benefit of 
the Ramsey tax reform. After all, the aforementioned disconnect between the intertemporal 
marginal rate of substitution and marginal rate of transformation suggests that the open economies 
afford better utility smoothing than the closed economy. The explanation is that in the open 
economy settings, international risk sharing implies that some of the benefits of the tax reform are 
enjoyed by foreign households. 
 
Assessment 
The sharp contrast in the results across these economic models highlight the underlying 
economic mechanisms. The fixed real exchange rate in the one good small open economy model 
severely limits the government’s ability to raise capital income tax revenue, an effect operating 
through a return arbitrage condition equating the return on international bonds with the return to 
capital. This consideration is entirely absent from the closed economy model, and the government 
chooses a very high capital income tax rate for one year (one model period). While the 
aforementioned arbitrage condition is present in the two good small open economy model, its 
effects are tempered by movements in the real exchange rate which allow the effective return on 
international bonds to respond to the tax reforms. 
The scant literature on Ramsey-optimal tax reforms in open economies has focused on the 
one good small open economy model; see, for example, Correia (1996). As shown in this section, 
fixing the real exchange rate is far from an innocuous assumption. 
The results in this section lead to two conclusions. First, considering the international 
dimension of tax reforms is important: The arbitrage condition in the small open economy models 











real exchange rate dynamics that arise from the two good small open economy model – but not in 
the one good model – moderates the effects of this arbitrage constraint. As a result, the benchmark 
two good small open economy model’s dynamics more closely resemble those of the closed 
economy model than the one good small open economy model. 
 
6. Alternative Parameter Settings 
Most of the parameters in the calibration are well pinned down. Chief among those that are 
not: the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the elasticity of substitution between private and 
public goods, the degree of trade openness, and the elasticity of substitution between home and 




The benchmark calibration sets the coefficient of relative risk aversion,  , and the 
elasticity of substitution between private and public consumption goods,  , equal to one. The 
advantage of these parameter values is that together they imply that utility is additively separable 
between private consumption, public consumption, and leisure. This separability implies that the 
cross partial derivatives of the utility function are zero which made it easier to work through the 
results in Section 5. 
To start, consider the effects of a plausibly higher setting for risk aversion: = 2 . As 
shown in Fig. 2, the time paths for the government policy variables are qualitatively very similar to 
the benchmark setting with logarithmic preferences. The paths of private consumption and hours 











intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Fluctuations in the real exchange rate and net exports are 
somewhat larger. Indeed, with higher risk aversion, net exports are more negative (relative to the 
benchmark calibration) for years 1 to 10 of the tax reform period. As a result, the home country 
becomes a larger net foreign debtor. The welfare benefit of the tax reform program falls from 4.4
% for the benchmark calibration to 3.4%. 
 
Figure 2: Dynamic Paths For Alternative Preference Parameter Values 
 
Less substitutability between private and public consumption ( =1/ 2 ) moderates the 
movements in private and public consumption, although qualitatively the dynamics of these 
variables are quite similar to the benchmark calibration. To afford the higher path for private 
consumption, households work more than in the benchmark. The one period rise in the capital 
income tax rate is larger: 227 % compared to 216 %. The paths for the real exchange rate, net 
exports and net foreign assets are quite similar to the benchmark case. The welfare benefit of the 
Ramsey tax reform rises from 4.4 % to 4.7 %. 
 
Trade Parameters 
The trade openness parameter,  , was set to 0.3  on the basis that the world import share 
is around 30%. The U.S. is less open than the world as a whole: its import share in the early 2000s 
is closer to 15%. Here,   is set to 0.05  which corresponds to the U.S. import share circa 1970. 
 












As shown in Fig. 3, a less open economy naturally has time paths that look much more like 
a closed economy than the benchmark model. The one period spike in the capital income tax rate, 
235 %, lies between that of the closed economy ( 260 %) and the benchmark model ( 216 %). Due 
to the higher capital income tax rate, government debt falls more when the economy is less open. 
As in the closed economy model, labor income is initially subsidized, albeit at a lower rate 
0( = 1.5
h  % rather than 24 %). At the start of the tax reform, there is a stronger depreciation of 
the real exchange rate ( 24 % compared to 19 %), followed by an attenuated appreciation relative 
to the initial real exchange rate ( 22 % versus 21 %). The exchange rate dynamics can be 
understood through the arbitrage condition equating the effective returns on international bonds 
and capital (see (32)). The larger increase in the capital income tax rate in period 1 leads to a 
similarly larger change in the effective return to capital. Effective return equality then requires a 
more substantial appreciation in the real exchange rate between dates 0  and 1. Further, given 
that the economy is far less open, the effects of these real exchange rate movements on the 
domestic macroeconomy are less onerous. The welfare benefit of the tax reform is virtually the 
same as the benchmark model: 4.4 % of consumption. 
 
Figure 4: Decomposition of Composite Home Consumption 
 
Finally, the elasticity between domestic and foreign goods in the private consumption 
aggregator, (3), is =1.5  in the benchmark model, a value used by Backus et al. (1992) and 
much of the subsequent international finance literature with distinct home and foreign goods. 
While there is much recent controversy in the empirical literature concerning this elasticity, De 











sharing), what matters is whether home and foreign goods are substitutes in utility ( >1 ) or 
complements ( <1 ). With this in mind, set this elasticity to 0.8 . Fig. 3 shows that this setting for 
  has little effect on the model’s time paths except for net exports and net foreign assets. In the 
benchmark calibration, the dynamics of net exports follow that of the real exchange rate. The long 
run real exchange rate depreciation is associated with positive net exports, and a negative net 
foreign asset position. These dynamics are reversed when the trade elasticity,  , is less than one. 
Fig. 4 digs deeper into these dynamics, presenting the paths of domestic consumption of the home- 
and foreign-produced goods. When these goods are substitutes in utility, as they are in the 
benchmark calibration, domestic households can relatively easily substitute between these two 
goods. As a result, the initial depreciation of the real exchange rate – which makes foreign goods 
relatively more expensive – leads to a substitution from foreign- to domestically-produced goods. 
In contrast, when the two goods are complements in utility, the two goods tend to be consumed 
together. Consequently, when <1 , domestic consumption of the home and foreign goods both 
increase. These results are an illustration of the Marshall-Lerner condition: the balance of trade 
improves following a real exchange rate depreciation if the sum of the absolute values of the 
import and export elasticities is larger than one. Given the similarity of the time paths of private 
and public consumption as well as hours worked, it is not surprising that the welfare benefit of the 
tax reform is 4.4 % as it is in the benchmark calibration. 
 
Summary 
Relative to the benchmark small open economy model, the alternative preference 
parameter values considered in this section lead to only modest changes in fiscal policy and so in 











behavior of net exports and net foreign assets when the trade elasticity between home and foreign 
goods,  , is less than one. The welfare benefit of the Ramsey tax plan remains substantial for the 
alternative parameter values considered. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper looked at Ramsey-optimal taxation in three economic environments: a closed 
economy, a one good small open economy, and a two good small open economy. All three deliver 
the traditional result that capital income should not be taxed in the long run; see Chamley (1986); 
Judd (1985) and the subsequent literature. However, the short run dynamics of these models differ 
considerably. In the closed economy, the government initially taxes capital income very heavily, 
driving down government debt. Contrast these dynamics with those of the one good open 
economy: immediately drop the tax rate on capital income to zero. Opening the economy to trade 
imposes an additional constraint on the benevolent government planner in the Ramsey optimal 
taxation problem: In choosing the tax rate on capital income, the rate of return on capital, net of 
taxes, cannot be dominated by the return on international assets. The one good open economy 
environment precludes real exchange rate movements. Lowering the capital income tax rate to 
zero raises the return to capital. Consequently, the economy experiences a large inflow of capital 
(negative net exports) in order to restore equality of the return to capital with the fixed return to 
international assets, without sacrificing domestic private consumption. These dynamics are similar 
to those reported in Correia (1996). 
The results in this paper show that the differences in the short run dynamics of the capital 
income tax rate are an artifact of the fixed exchange rate inherent to the one good open economy 











is endogenously determined. In such a setting, the relevant return to foreign assets is no longer 
fixed, but rather includes a term reflecting real exchange rate movements. The Ramsey planner 
manipulates the real exchange rate – a sharp depreciation followed by an even sharper appreciation 
– which lowers the effective return to foreign assets, giving the planner room to raise the capital 
income tax rate. As a result, the capital income tax dynamics in the two good open economy 
environment look quite similar to those of the closed economy. 
Two lessons can be drawn. First, opening the economy to trade is important because it 
imposes on the Ramsey planner an additional constraint: capital cannot be dominated in rate of 
return by foreign assets. Second, real exchange rate dynamics are important. The fixed real 
exchange rate inherent to the one good open economy model probably does not reflect the 
environment faced by policymakers. Certainly, the results from the one good model are not 













Appendix A. The Ramsey Allocation is also a Competitive Equilibrium 
This appendix shows that the allocation chosen by the Ramsey planner, 
 
=0{ , , , , , }t t t t t t tc g h k e p
  (A.1) 
can be supported as a competitive equilibrium. 
To start, factor prices are obtained from the first-order conditions to the firm’s problem: 
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Next, combine (14) and (15) as 
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which gives the labor income tax rate. Combine (14) and (16) to obtain 
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which gives the capital income tax rate. 
Given factor prices in (A.2), the Ramsey allocation is consistent with firm profit 
maximization since (A.2) are the firm’s first-order conditions. We need to show that the Ramsey 
allocation is consistent with household optimization. The implementability condition (20) in the 
Ramsey problem implies that the household budget constraint (2) holds with equality. Setting the 
tax rates to satisfy (A.3) and (A.4) means that the household first-order conditions (14) and (16) 
are satisfied. For household optimization, it remains to show that the first-order conditions (17) 
and (18) hold. (14) and (17) imply 
 1 1 1 1
1
( , , ) ( , , )
= .t c t t t t c t t t
b b
t t
eU c g h e U c g h
p R p R
    

 (A.5) 













( , , )
= ,t c t t t
t
eU c g h
p
  (A.6) 
and so (A.5) is necessarily satisfied given =bR   (as it is in our calibration). It is, then, 
straightforward to show that (17) and (18) are satisfied. We have, then, shown that the Ramsey 
allocation is consistent with household optimizing behavior. 
All that remains to show is that the government budget constraint is satisfied for the 
Ramsey allocation. Recall that the household budget constraint (2) is satisfied by virtue of the 
planner satisfying the implementability condition. Use (A.2) to substitute for factor prices in (2): 
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Rearrange the terms in (A.7) as 
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Since the production function is homogeneous of degree one, Euler’s theorem for homogeneous 
functions implies that 2 1 1 1 1 1( , ) ( , ) = ( , )t t t t t t t tF k h h F k h k F k h    . Use this fact and the domestic 
goods market clearing condition (10) to obtain 
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Next, since the international solvency condition in the Ramsey problem, (26), was developed from 
the balance of payments equation, (11), it follows that (11) is satisfied for the Ramsey allocation. 
Rearrange the terms in (11) as 
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In equilibrium the consumption bundler earns zero profits; thus, the bundler’s revenue equals its 
expenses: 
 = .t t ht t ftp c c e c  (A.12) 
For the small open economy, =1   and so (4) to (6) read 
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Substituting (A.12) to (A.15) into (A.11) and canceling terms leaves the government budget 
constraint (9). 
 
Appendix B. Complete Descriptions of the Closed and One Good Open Economy Models 
Appendix B.1. The Closed Economy Model 
The representative household’s problem is: 
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The government budget constraint is (9). 
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Appendix B.2 The One Good Small Open Economy Model 
The representative domestic household solves: 
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The typical firm’s problem and government budget constraint are as above. 
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Appendix C. First-order Conditions to the Ramsey Problem: The Two Good Small Open 
Economy Model 
Defining 
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the Ramsey problem can be written: 
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The = 0t  first-order conditions are: 
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In addition, (4), (10) and (A.6) must be satisfied. 
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